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Abstract:  If knowledge requires safety, then one might think that when the epistemic 
source of knowledge is testimony, that testimony must itself be safe.  Otherwise, will 
not the lack of safety transfer from testimony to hearer, such that hearer will lack 
knowledge?  Resisting this natural line of reasoning, Goldberg (2005; 2007) argues 
that testimonial knowledge through unsafe testimony is possible on the basis of two 
cases.  Lackey (2008) and Pelling (2013) criticize Goldberg’s examples.  But Pelling 
goes on to provide his own example that attempts to show that Goldberg’s thesis is 
true: one can gain safe testimonial belief from unsafe testimony.  If any of these 
counterexamples were correct, they would undermine the main reason to think that 
knowledge based on unsafe testimony is impossible.  My aim in this paper is to 
critically assess these arguments, and to consider the possibility of knowledge through 
unsafe testimony.  Drawing a general moral from the analysis of these cases, I shall 
contend that it is impossible to acquire safe belief solely on the basis of unsafe 
testimony.  If so, then testimonial knowledge based solely on unsafe testimony is 
impossible.   
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1. Introduction: 
It is widely held that knowledge is a state that must in some sense be non-
luckily true1.  If one gains a true belief in a way that involves too much of certain 
kinds of luck, then no matter what else the belief has going for it, it does not amount 
to knowledge.  One might think that this is one of the central lessons of the Gettier 
problem.  While there are different ways of trying to make precise the notion of luck 
at play in Gettier cases, one popular and influential proposal for spelling out what this 
                                                
1 This is widely, though not universally, held.  For defences of the idea that there can be lucky 
knowledge, and indeed knowledge in Gettier cases, see for example the work of Stephen Hetherington.  
For an early expression of his Knowing Lucky proposal, see Hetherington (1998); for a reply, see 
Madison (2011).  Hetherington (2013) and Pritchard (2013) debate whether knowledge is incompatible 
with luckily true belief.  Hetherington (2016) is his latest and most detailed response to the anti-luck 
tradition in contemporary epistemology. 
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anti-luck condition amounts to is in terms of safety.  Very roughly, a belief is safe if, 
given how it is formed, it could not have easily been false.  According to this 
proposal, safety is taken to be a necessary condition on knowledge in general, 
regardless of its source. 
If knowledge requires safety, then one might think that when the epistemic 
source of knowledge is testimony, that testimony must itself be safe.  Otherwise, will 
not the lack of safety transfer from testimony to hearer, such that hearer will lack 
knowledge?  Resisting this natural line of reasoning, Goldberg (2005; 2007) argues 
that testimonial knowledge through unsafe testimony is possible on the basis of 
counterexamples.  Lackey (2008) and Pelling (2013) criticize Goldberg’s examples.  
But Pelling goes on to provide his own example that attempts to show that Goldberg’s 
thesis is true: one can gain safe testimonial belief from unsafe testimony.  If any of 
these counterexamples were correct, they would undermine the main reason to think 
that knowledge based on unsafe testimony is impossible.   
My aim in this paper is to critically assess these arguments, and to consider the 
general possibility of knowledge through unsafe testimony.  I shall criticize 
Goldberg’s examples, but for different reasons than Lackey and Pelling.  I shall also 
argue that, despite initial appearances to the contrary, Pelling’s example suffers from 
the same defects as Goldberg’s.  Drawing a general moral from the analysis of these 
cases, I shall contend that it is impossible to acquire safe belief solely on the basis of 
unsafe testimony.  If so, then testimonial knowledge based solely on unsafe testimony 
is impossible.   
Before proceeding, it is worth pausing to ask: what is the significance of the 
question of whether or not one can gain knowledge through unsafe testimony?  At 
least one answer immediately presents itself: if safety is a necessary condition on 
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knowledge, but safe testimony is not necessary for someone to acquire knowledge via 
testimony, then this would show that testimony can generate knowledge, rather than 
always merely transmit knowledge that someone else already possesses.  While 
Jennifer Lackey, for one, has prominently argued for the view that testimony can 
generate knowledge, her arguments do not turn on the issue of safety (e.g. Lackey 
1999; Lackey 2008).  Therefore, if knowledge on the basis of unsafe testimony is 
possible, it would provide an additional independent line of argument against the 
position that testimony merely transmits knowledge, rather than being a generative 
source.  In short, in addition to the intrinsic epistemological interest of the question of 
whether testimonial knowledge requires a safe basis, answering this question can shed 
light on the nature of testimony in general.    
 
2. The Safety Condition: 
So what is safety?  Safety is normally introduced as one way of spelling out 
the sense in which knowledge must be non-lucky2.  The exact formulation of safety is 
not a trivial matter, but when talking about the safety of beliefs, the intuitive idea is 
that a true belief is safe just in case it could not have easily been false.  Somewhat 
more precisely: to say that a belief is safe is to say that not only is the belief actually 
true, but in all nearby worlds where the subject forms the belief in the same way as in 
the actual world, the belief is still true3.  For example, suppose I believe that I have 
                                                
2 A rival way of attempting to capture the sense in which knowledge is non-lucky is in terms of 
Sensitivity.  A belief that p is sensitive when, if p were false, one would not believe that p.  A sensitive 
belief is one that tracks the truth, so to speak.  Prominent advocates of a sensitivity condition on 
knowledge include Dretske (1970); Nozick (1981).  For a recent collection of papers on the sensitivity 
condition in epistemology, see Becker and Black (2012).  
3 What is it to form a belief in the same way in other worlds?  Questions about generality and the 
individuation of belief forming methods and bases immediately arise.  This issue is familiar from 
discussions of the ‘generality problem’ for reliabilist theories of epistemic justification.  See Conee and 
Feldman (1998) for an early and influential presentation of this objection against reliabilism.  The 
problem, in outline, is this: a token method or way of forming true beliefs is an instance of a more 
general type of method that can be more or less reliable.  However, which types of methods are the 
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hands on the basis of seeing my hands.  Assuming that everything is normal and as it 
appears, that belief is safe since, not only is the belief true, but given its basis, that 
belief could not easily be false.  In all nearby worlds where I believe that I have hands 
because I see that I do, that belief is still true.  I am not infallible of course, but for 
that belief to be false given that it is based on how things appear, things would have to 
very different than they actually are.  For example, in those worlds I would be 
hallucinating, or more radical still, the deceived victim of an evil demon.  The thought 
is that since these are remote possibilities, they do not undermine my belief that I 
have hands being safely true.    
In order to avoid counterexamples, it is important to note in general, and for 
our discussion of testimonial belief in particular, that safety must be relativized to 
methods or bases.  To modify an example of Nozick’s in discussing a sensitivity 
condition on knowledge, suppose that I see my daughter and thereby come to know 
that she does not have a cold.  Compare that to a case where I instead call my wife 
and ask how our daughter is, and I am told she is healthy and well.  But suppose also 
that in the second case, given that my wife does not like me to worry, she would have 
told me on the phone that our daughter did not have a cold, even if she did.  Suppose 
finally that while I in fact saw my daughter, I very easily could have not seen her, and 
so would in those close worlds have phoned my wife to ask after our daughter.  
Seemingly, the fact that I could have very easily formed a false belief in the second 
case is not relevant to whether or not I have knowledge in the first case.   
                                                                                                                                      
relevant ones here?  A process type can be individuated more or less finely, with the associated 
reliability varying widely.  For example, when I form a belief about the presence of a mug on the table 
before me, which method am I using?  Is it perception, or visual perception, or visual perception in 
good lighting, etc.?  Some of these methods are far more reliable than others, and yet the charge is that 
it is difficult (if not impossible) to non-arbitrarily say which method is the one whose reliability is 
relevant to whether or not epistemic justification obtains, or in this case, to whether or not a belief is 
safely formed.  A complete theory of safety will require a solution to the generality problem, but 
providing such an account is outside the scope of this paper. For some recent responses that have tried 
to solve the generality problem, see for example Heller (1995); Beebe (2004); Comesana (2006); 
Becker (2008).    
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This highlights that the issue is not whether I could have easily had a false 
belief about my daughter’s health, but whether or not I could have easily been wrong, 
given the basis of my belief.  So where the basis of belief is my seeing her, that belief 
is safe, and constitutes knowledge, whereas when the basis of my belief is phoning 
my wife in the circumstances described, that belief is not safe, and so does not amount 
to knowledge even if true, given that my belief could have very easily been false 
formed on that basis.  
Safety is most often introduced in the context of discussing the sense in which 
beliefs can be non-lucky, but following Charlie Pelling, we can define an analogous 
notion of Safe Testimony: ‘Where one testifies that p on basis B, one’s testimony is 
safe just if there is no close possibility in which one falsely testifies that p on B.’  
(Pelling, 2013, p. 209)  So if my wife testifies that our daughter is healthy and well on 
the basis of seeing that she is, that testimony is safe just if there is no close possibility 
in which she falsely testifies that our daughter is healthy and well on the basis of how 
she appears. 
For the purposes of this paper, I shall assume that knowledge requires safety.  
But I trust that this is not a groundless assumption.  What motivates safety?  Briefly, 
safety is motivated by the theoretical work it can do in at least two different central 
debates in epistemology.  First, safety has been proposed as part of the analysis of 
knowledge and as a response to the Gettier problem.  For example, a failure of safety 
has been proposed as a diagnosis of why Gettier cases arise, and since a Gettiered 
belief is not knowledge, safety has been proposed as a necessary condition on 
knowledge (e.g. see Pritchard 2005; Pritchard 2015).   
A second motivation for the safety principle is the work it is meant to do as a 
key premise in Neo-Moorean responses to radical skepticism (e.g. see Sosa 1999; 
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Pritchard 2005; Pritchard 2007).  According to the Neo-Moorean, given that relying 
on one’s perceptual experiences can be a safe way of forming true beliefs about the 
external world, this is meant to provide part of the theoretical explanation that Moore 
himself failed to provide in his infamous ‘proof’ of the external world. 
So with the notions of safe belief and safe testimony to hand, and the 
assumption that knowledge requires safety, we can now explore our central question: 
when a belief that p is formed on the basis of testimony, must this testimony be safe 
for the testimony-based belief to become knowledge that p?  
 
3. Goldberg’s Examples 
 Sanford Goldberg (2005; 2007) offers two cases in support of the claim that 
testimonial knowledge through unsafe testimony is possible.  We shall consider each 
of his examples in turn.  The first case is the following: 
   
Goldberg’s First Case - MILK CARTON:  Frank is a writer who spends his mornings in 
the kitchen, where he follows a mildly eccentric ritual.  Every day after finishing his bowl of 
cereal at around dawn, he discards whatever milk is left, but places the empty carton back in 
the fridge, where it remains until noon, when he takes out the trash.  Today, his sister Mary 
and nephew Sonny are visiting.  Having had a tiring journey, they sleep in and join Frank in 
the kitchen in the late morning.  Mary sees the milk carton in the fridge, assumes it is full, and 
on that basis tells Sonny that there is milk in the fridge.  As it happens, there is indeed milk in 
the carton this morning, since Frank forgot to perform his ritual.  Upon overhearing Mary’s 
testimony, Frank is reminded of his blunder and realizes that he forgot to discard of the milk 
this morning; at the same moment, Sonny, on the basis of his mother’s testimony, forms the 
belief that there is milk in the fridge.  Had Frank performed his ritual, he would have 
immediately corrected Mary and would have informed his visitors that the carton was empty.  
(Gelfert, 2014, p. 156, which paraphrases and simplifies Goldberg 2005 p. 302)     
 
Commenting on the case, Goldberg (2005), Jennifer Lackey (2008, ch. 3.3), and 
Charlie Pelling (2013, pp. 210-212) all say that Mary’s testimony is unsafe: although 
her statement that there is milk in the fridge is true, it could have easily been false, 
namely in the close worlds where Frank performs his milk dumping ritual.  But 
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Goldberg argues that despite Mary’s unsafe testimony, Sonny’s belief is safe.  This is 
because there are no nearby worlds where Sonny forms his belief on the basis of 
Mary’s testimony and it is false, since in all those worlds, Frank is ‘silently 
monitoring’ (as Lackey and Pelling describe his contribution) and would correct 
Mary’s testimony.  In those cases, Sonny would not form the false belief that there is 
milk in the fridge. 
Lackey presents Goldberg with a dilemma (which Pelling also endorses): 
either Sonny’s belief is unsafe or else it is not wholly based on testimony (Ibid.).  
Arguing for the first horn of the dilemma, Lackey contends that Sonny’s belief is 
unsafe since temporal order matters: at the moment when he forms his belief, it is 
solely based on Mary’s unsafe testimony, and so it is unsafe.  It is only after Sonny 
forms the belief that Frank’s monitoring kicks in (even if only seconds later).  As for 
the second horn of the dilemma, Sonny’s belief might then become safe, after uncle 
Frank’s silent monitoring begins, but now his belief is no longer based solely on 
Mary’s testimony.  At this later time, Sonny’s belief is now based on two things: 
Mary’s testimony, plus Frank’s silent monitoring.   
Why, according to Lackey and Pelling, does Sonny’s belief when safe not 
count as properly testimonial?  This is because they both endorse a very strict notion 
of testimonial belief.  Pelling, citing Lackey, writes that ‘a belief does not count as 
testimonial if, though causally dependent on an act of testimony, it depends for its 
epistemic credentials on a non-testimonial act.’  (emphasis added) (Pelling, 2013, p. 
211; cf. Lackey, 2008, p. 84)  A consequence of this is that, for a belief to count as 
testimonial, it must be epistemically grounded exclusively on an act of testimony.  The 
thought is that if Sonny’s belief amounts to knowledge, an element of its epistemic 
credentials, that is, part of that which helps convert his true belief into knowledge, is 
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something non-testimonial.  If Sonny’s belief amounts to knowledge, this is because 
not only is his belief supported by Mary’s testimony, but also because his belief is 
safe, which in turn depends essentially on Frank’s so-called silent monitoring – a 
factor which is not itself testimonial.  So, they contend, Sonny’s belief is not 
testimonial.   
One might wonder: is this not a very narrow and strict notion of what counts 
as a testimonial belief?  If it is employed, is there any purely testimonial belief in this 
sense?  I take that to be an open question, one which I intend my discussion to answer 
(section 5 below presents my full answer to this question).  In addition, some further 
comments are in order.  First, Lackey and Pelling implicitly rely upon this notion of 
testimonial belief in their respective discussions.  Accordingly, I propose that we 
accept it as part of the terms of the debate.   
Second, and even more importantly, as Pelling notes (2013, section 2.2), it is 
only on a very strict notion of testimonial belief that the epistemologically interesting 
question of whether there can be safe testimonial belief on the basis of unsafe 
testimony arises.  This is the interesting question, since the question of whether one 
can gain safe testimonial belief, when it is based only partly on unsafe testimony, is 
answered trivially.  As Lackey and Pelling both note, obviously one can gain a safe 
belief that is partly based on unsafe testimony and partly based on other (safe) 
sources, like one’s own perception, or memory, or other non-testimonial sources.   
To see this, let us distinguish Strict from Liberal conceptions of testimonial 
belief as follows:  
Strict Conception of Testimonial Belief: for a belief that p to count as testimonial, it 
must depend for its epistemic status exclusively on an act of testimony.  
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Liberal Conception of Testimonial Belief: for a belief that p to count as testimonial, 
it must partly depend for its epistemic status an act of testimony, and partly depend 
for its epistemic status on something non-testimonial.4 
 
It is only on a strict conception of testimonial belief that we would get 
interesting and novel philosophical results of the sort that Goldberg and Pelling aim to 
establish.  This is because on the Liberal Conception of Testimonial belief, the answer 
to the question of whether there can be safe testimonial belief in that sense, on the 
basis of unsafe testimony, is straightforward.  As Pelling himself illustrates,  
 
[…] if we use the more liberal conception, it becomes fairly easy to establish that one can 
gain safe testimonial belief from unsafe testimony. For example, consider the following: 
 
RED BARN: John phones me to say that he can see a (real) red barn. Although 
John’s testimony is true, it might easily have been false. For unbeknown to 
him the area contains many fake barns which until yesterday were painted red. 
However, I happen to know that all the fakes have now been repainted blue: 
the only remaining red barn in the area is real. I thereby come to believe, 
partly on the basis of John’s testimony and partly on the basis of my 
background knowledge, that John can see a red barn. 
 
In this case, it seems that although John’s testimony is unsafe, the belief I form partly 
on the basis of that testimony is safe. So if we allow my belief to count as ‘testimonial’, 
in virtue of its partly testimonial basis, then the case seems straightforwardly to confirm 
that one can gain safe testimonial belief from unsafe testimony.  (Pelling, 2013, p. 209)   
For these reasons, then, the Strict Conception of Testimonial Belief will be assumed 
when investigating the possibility of testimonial knowledge through unsafe testimony. 
I agree with Lackey and Pelling that Goldberg’s first example faces the 
dilemma that either Sonny’s belief is unsafe, or else it is not a testimonial belief, 
strictly so-called, and so it is not a counterexample to the claim that testimonial 
knowledge requires safe testimony.  But I suggest that we should reject Pelling and 
Lackey’s focus on non-testimonial acts in accounting for whether a belief should be 
                                                
4 Thank you to an anonymous referee for this journal for noting that the choice between strict and 
liberal conceptions of testimonial belief will in part depend upon one’s position in the reductionism / 
non-reductionism debate in the epistemology of testimony.  For a discussion of the distinction between 
reductionism and non-reductionism about testimonial knowledge, see for example Lackey (2006) pp.4-
6. 
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counted as purely testimonial.  If MILK CARTON is not a case of a purely 
testimonial belief because of Frank’s contribution, which I agree that it is not, this is 
not because of any non-testimonial act on Frank’s part.  This, I suggest, is because 
there is no relevant act on Frank’s part at all.   
Lackey and Pelling describe Frank as silently monitoring the situation.  
Assuming for a moment that this is a correct description, is silent monitoring itself an 
act?    It might seem more like a passive state in which one can acquire information.  
But even if silent monitoring is in general an action, is that really what Frank is doing 
in this case?  After all, he is not actively attending to the situation, nor is he intending 
to listen out for errors.  For that matter, there is nothing that he is trying to do related 
to either Mary’s testimony or Sonny’s beliefs.  He simply overhears Mary, and at that 
point is reminded that he forgot to perform his milk-dumping ritual.  Overhearing 
something, and being reminded of something, are not actions either.  At that point, 
there is no relevant act on Frank’s part, but the following counterfactual is now true: 
had he performed his ritual, he would have immediately corrected Mary, and he 
would have informed his visitors that the carton was empty.  And Frank’s presence in 
this situation, something non-testimonial, is now partly the source of the epistemic 
credentials of Sonny’s belief. 
So while Lackey and Pelling are right that Sonny’s belief is not purely 
testimonial in the strict sense that they are interested in, this not because it depends 
for its epistemic credentials on a non-testimonial act.  Rather, it is a non-testimonial- 
something that is partly the source of Sonny’s belief’s epistemic credentials: here it is 
Frank’s presence and what he would do if he were to hear Mary speak falsely.  I 
suggest that in order to capture why Sonny’s belief should not be thought of as purely 
testimonial, we need to move from focusing narrowly on non-testimonial acts, to: 
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Testimonial Belief: a belief does not count as testimonial if it depends for its epistemic 
credentials (i.e. its positive epistemic status) on something non-testimonial. 
 
 
In addition to allowing us to diagnose why Sonny’s belief is not purely testimonial, 
this notion of testimonial belief will also allow us to see why Goldberg’s example of 
YANKEE FAN, discussed below, is arguably not a case of testimonial belief in the 
relevant sense either, if it is indeed safe. 
I would like to now raise an additional worry about MILK CARTON, which 
challenges the assumption that Goldberg, Lackey, and Pelling all share: that Mary’s 
testimony is actually unsafe.  As noted above, each holds that Mary’s testimony is 
unsafe since although her statement that there is milk in the fridge is true, it could 
have easily been false, namely in the close worlds where Frank performs his milk 
dumping ritual. 
But notice that the very thing that makes Sonny’s belief safe also makes 
Mary’s testimony safe, namely, Frank’s presence.  Frank’s presence oversees both 
Mary’s testimony and Sonny’s belief formation and retention.  Lackey and Pelling 
both assume this temporal order of events: Mary asserts at t1; Sonny forms a belief at 
t2; Frank silently monitors at T3; Sonny retains the belief at t4 – and Sonny’s belief 
only becomes safe at t4  (Lackey, 2008, p. 82; Pelling, 2013, p. 211).  But another 
understanding of the temporal order, I suggest, is this: Mary asserts at t1; also at t1 
Frank is present and overhears what she says; Sonny forms his belief at t2…this belief 
is safe at the time it is formed because of Frank’s silent contribution.  But that very 
same contribution also assures that Mary’s testimony is safe too – if Mary spoke 
falsely, Frank would immediately correct Mary, and she would retract her previous 
statement.   
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One might object that given the definition of safe testimony that we are 
assuming, it seems that we have no choice but to consider Mary’s testimony unsafe5.  
That is, recall that the relevant notion of safe testimony is this: ‘Where one testifies 
that p on basis B, one’s testimony is safe just if there is no close possibility in which 
one falsely testifies that p on B.’  (Pelling, 2013, p. 209)  So the fact that Mary would 
retract her statement if Frank had performed his milk dumping ritual and intervened 
does not help us, the objection continues.  Mary would have asserted the same 
utterance on the basis of the same perceptual data, and in many of those nearby 
worlds her utterance is false.  So her testimony is unsafe. 
I submit that this objection presupposes an overly narrow conception of what 
counts as the basis for an assertion.  Part of the aim of this paper is argue that we 
should not think of epistemic bases (for belief or assertion) too narrowly: we need to 
appreciate that external factors and an epistemically favorable environment are 
essential not only to knowledge generally, but also to testimonial knowledge in 
particular (see especially sections 4 and 5 below for the development of these points).   
It is correct that the content of Mary’s utterance, the proposition that there is 
milk in the fridge, while actually true, could have easily been false.  But given the 
temporal order of the events I am considering, Frank is ‘silently monitoring’ the 
situation as Mary speaks.  Had she spoken falsely, the utterance would not have been 
left to stand.  So when Sonny forms his belief that there is milk in fridge, on the basis 
of his mother’s standing assertion, given the presence of his uncle, that particular 
speech act could not have easily been false, given its basis (construed broadly as 
including not only the perceptual data Mary has to go on, but also including Frank’s 
silent contribution).  In short, if we allow that Frank’s presence is able to make 
                                                
5 Thanks to anonymous referee for pressing me to consider this objection. 
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Sonny’s belief safe, it is open for us to hold that it also makes Mary’s testimony safe.  
Frank’s presence oversees both Mary’s testimony and Sonny’s belief formation and 
retention. 
So Goldberg does not provide a case of safe belief based on unsafe testimony: 
either as I have suggested Mary’s testimony and Sonny’s belief are both safe, or as 
Lackey and Pelling argue, Sonny’s belief is unsafe, or if his belief is safe, it is not 
wholly based on testimony, in the strict sense that we are considering. 
Goldberg (2007) offers a second example that purports to also show that 
testimonial knowledge through unsafe testimony is possible: 
 
Goldberg’s Second Case - YANKEE FAN:  When Ralph reads in the newspapers that his 
beloved New York Yankees have won, he bases his testimony about his team on those 
newspaper reports.  When the newspapers report that the Yankees have lost, however, Ralph 
cannot bring himself to accept what he reads, and he bases his testimony instead on wishful 
thinking.  But a curious feature of Ralph’s testimony is that whenever it is based on 
newspaper reports, he speaks noticeably more confidently than he does when his testimony is 
based on wishful thinking.  Joan is well aware of this tendency of Ralph’s and as a result, she 
only accepts his testimony when he speaks confidently.  The Yankees play and though they 
might easily have lost, they win.  Ralph reads about their victory in the newspapers, and 
confidently tells Joan that they won.  Joan accepts his testimony.  (Pelling 2013, p. 212; 
Goldberg 2007, p. 322) 
 
 
Commenting on the case, Goldberg says that Ralph’s testimony is unsafe, 
since the Yankees could have easily lost, and if they had, Ralph would still have 
testified that they had won on the basis of his wishful thinking.  Goldberg maintains 
that Joan’s belief is safe, however, since if Ralph had falsely said that they had won, 
she would not have accepted his testimony, as his assertion would have been made 
noticeably less confidently. 
I shall offer two objections to this case.  First, like the second interpretation of 
Sonny’s belief above, it seems that Joan’s belief is not wholly testimonial.  While it is 
certainly partly based on the content of Ralph’s assertion, notice that Joan accepts 
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Ralph’s assertion not on the basis of his say so alone, but on the basis of his 
testimony, plus the fact that he asserted confidently, plus her knowledge that how 
confidently Ralph asserts something is a reliable indicator that what he says is true 
(which is not itself testimonial).  Just as Sonny’s safe belief above was not wholly 
testimonial given his uncle’s epistemic contribution, so too is Joan’s belief not wholly 
testimonial, given that it depends for its epistemic credentials on non-testimonial 
factors. 
Second, why think that Ralph’s testimony is unsafe?  It is important to see that 
given its basis, his testimony could not have easily been false, given the general 
reliability of the newspapers reporting the sports results6.  Accordingly, this seems 
analogous to a case of evidential luck, and such luck does not undermine safety or 
knowledge7.  Evidential luck, as it applies to beliefs, is when one is lucky to have the 
evidence one does, but given that one has the evidence, it is not lucky that one’s belief 
is true.  For example, suppose one just happens to see a poster advertising a play 
reading that night – one very easily could have missed the poster, and so would not 
have formed a true belief.  Nevertheless, despite the presence of this kind of luck, one 
does know that there is a play reading that night on the basis of luckily seeing the 
poster.  Given that one did see the poster, and given that it was reliably created, and 
given that the play reading could not easily have been cancelled etc., one’s belief 
could not easily have been false.  As this example shows, such luck is compatible 
with knowledge.  
Veritic luck, by contrast, arises when even given how a belief is formed, it 
could have very easily been false.  For example, suppose a printer malfunctioned and 
                                                
6 In objecting to Goldberg’s case, Pelling also suggests that Ralph’s testimony is in fact safe, given its 
basis (Pelling asks us to assume that since the newspapers Ralph reads are carefully edited, there is no 
close possibility in which they contain a misprint); Pelling (2013), pp. 212-213. 
7 See Pritchard (2005) for a detailed articulation of the distinction between veritic and evidential luck, 
given in the course of developing and defending an anti-luck epistemology.  
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randomly produced a date and time on a poster that advertised a play reading, and as 
it happened, there was a play reading at the time and day advertised.  Unaware of all 
this, suppose that one saw the poster, and on the basis truly believed that there was a 
play reading that night.  Here one’s true belief is unsafe and does not amount to 
knowledge.  It seems that this is due to the presence of vertitic luck: given how one’s 
belief was formed, it could have very easily been false (namely in all the close worlds 
where the wrong date and time were randomly printed on the poster).     
Returning to the case of Ralph with this distinction in hand, but applying it to 
testimony, we can see that his testimony is safe.  Given its basis, Ralph’s testimony 
could not have easily been false, given the general reliability of the newspapers 
reporting the sports results.  While there is a sense in which it is lucky that his 
testimony is true, this is a benign kind of evidential luck that does not undermine 
safety. 
Sensitive to these kinds of issues, Goldberg claims that Ralph’s testimony is 
not safe, but he makes no claims about whether the belief Ralph expresses in the 
testimony is safe (Goldberg, 2007, p. 323).  But as Pelling notes, Goldberg must 
assume that safe testimony does not relativize to safe bases in the way that safe belief 
does, but no explanation of this alleged difference is given in his paper (Pelling, 2013, 
p. 213)8.  But this is a mistake.  As I illustrated above, the evidential vs. veritic luck 
                                                
8 An anonymous referee for this journal rightly noted that Goldberg (2007) defers to Lackey (then 
forthcoming; now Lackey (2006)) for the claim that ‘it is the safety of the testimony, rather than that of 
the belief manifested by the testimony, that is relevant to the epistemic status of the hearer’s belief 
formed through accepting the testimony.’  (Goldberg, 2007, p. 323)  Accordingly, one might think, 
different conditions of safety apply for belief and testimony.   
First, my concern here is specifically whether or not safe testimony relativizes to bases in the 
way that safe belief does, regardless of other sorts of differences that there might be between the safety 
of belief and testimony.  As Pelling and I note, Goldberg (2007) provides no argument that safe 
testimony should not be relativized to bases in the same way as safe belief.  So as Pelling suggests, 
given that this is essential to Goldberg’s example, the onus is on him to explain why there should be 
this disanalogy between belief and testimony.  But in addition to the issue of the burden of proof, I 
have directly argued that it is a mistake to hold that safe testimony should not be relativised to bases.  
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distinction seems to apply just as much to testimony as it does to belief, and so safe 
testimony needs to be relativized to bases just as belief does.  
So given that Joan’s belief is not wholly based on testimony, in the strict sense 
that we are considering, and given that Ralph’s testimony is not unsafe, given its 
basis, YANKEE FAN is not a case of safe testimonial belief based on unsafe 
testimony.  
 
4. Pelling’s Example  
 Aiming to provide a counterexample of his own to the view that safe 
testimonial belief requires safe testimony, Charlie Pelling provides an example that he 
claims avoids the dilemma facing Goldberg’s examples.  The following example is 
presented as one where the speaker’s testimony is unsafe, the hearer’s belief is safe, 
and the hearer’s belief is presented as being wholly based on testimony: 
 
TERRITORIAL FARMER:  Farmer Fred is highly territorial.  He worries continually that 
Randy may be trespassing on his land.  Fred hears a rustle in the bushes.  In his agitated state 
of mind, he jumps straight to the conclusion that it was Randy who made the rustle.  On that 
basis, Fred shouts ‘Randy, you’re trespassing on my land’.  Although the rustle might easily 
have been made by something else (there are many wild animals in the area), it so happens 
that Randy did make the rustle and he is indeed trespassing on Fred’s land.  On hearing Fred’s 
words, Randy comes to believe that he is trespassing on Fred’s land.  (Pelling, 2013, p. 213) 
 
Pelling says that the key to making this an example of safe testimonial belief based on 
unsafe testimony is to fill out the details as follows: ‘the range of Fred’s land extends 
much further than the carry of his voice.’  (original emphasis) (Ibid. p. 214)  This 
ensures that in all cases where Randy hears Fred’s words, and so comes to believe 
that he is trespassing on that basis, he is indeed trespassing. 
                                                                                                                                      
As I illustrated above, the evidential vs. veritic luck distinction applies just as much to testimony as it 
does to belief. 
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A first question about the case: is Fred’s testimony unsafe?  Pelling argues that 
it is: there are many nearby worlds where the rustle is made by something other than 
Randy, such as wild animals, and Fred makes the same assertion, but it is false.  In 
those worlds the rustle is made by something other than Randy, and Randy is not 
trespassing.  A second question about the case arises: is Randy’s belief safe?  The 
answer, Pelling argues, is yes.  He explains:  
[…] in any of the close possibilities where Randy believes, on the basis of Fred’s words, that 
he is trespassing on Fred’s land, Randy is indeed trespassing: if he had not been trespassing, 
he would not have been able to hear Fred and hence would not have been able to form any 
belief on the basis of his words. (original emphasis) (Ibid.) 
 
As for the third question which would establish if this is a genuine counterexample, is 
Randy’s belief based wholly on Fred’s testimony?  Here too, Pelling suggests, the 
answer is yes: ‘the only possible source from which Randy’s belief can gain its 
epistemic credentials is Fred’s testimony.’  (Ibid. p. 215)  If we grant that Fred’s 
testimony is unsafe, and Randy’s belief is both safe and wholly based on it, we then 
have a counterexample that proves the possibility of safe belief though unsafe 
testimony.  This, in turn, would go some way to establishing that testimonial 
knowledge is possible on the basis of unsafe testimony.  
 So, is TERRITORIAL FARMER a successful counterexample?  I suggest that 
it is not, and in fact, upon closer inspection, it shares the same defects as Goldberg’s 
examples.  In answering the second question, of whether Randy’s belief is safe, it is 
important to see that it is only safe if we individuate the basis of his belief very 
widely, including not just the assertion, but all the surrounding circumstances as well 
that make an essential epistemic contribution.  If we individuate the basis of Randy’s 
belief very narrowly, holding that the basis of his belief is only Fred’s statement, then 
Randy’s belief is unsafe.  This is so since there are nearby worlds where for example, 
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Fred makes the same assertion from other parts of his property and his voice carries 
over the property line to where Randy is standing, and he forms the false belief that he 
is trespassing.  Randy’s belief is only safe on assumption that the ‘same basis’ 
includes holding fixed not only Fred’s testimony, but also Fred’s and Randy’s relative 
locations, the volume of Fred’s voice etc.  In that case Randy’s belief is not purely 
testimonial; if Randy’s belief is based only on Fred’s words, then Randy’s belief is 
unsafe.   
 One might object that this argument assumes an odd conception of an 
epistemic basis, such that the basis of a belief must include everything that occurs in 
nearby possible worlds.9  For example, if Al believes that ‘here is a mug’, the laws of 
logic and events that occurred 5000 years ago are plausibly not thought to be part of 
the basis of Al’s belief, even though these truths are kept fixed in all nearby worlds.  
Likewise, one might object, facts about Fred’s and Randy’s relative locations, the 
volume of Fred’s voice etc., should not be counted as part of the basis of Randy’s 
belief, despite the fact that they may be modally robust features in nearby worlds.  
Since they are not part of the basis of Randy’s belief, his belief can be based solely on 
testimony and nonetheless be safe. 
This much is correct: the laws of logic and events that occurred 5000 years 
ago are not part of the basis of Al’s belief.  Rather, these things are kept fixed in all 
nearby worlds because they are modally robust features of the actual world.  The 
reason they are not part of the belief’s basis, however, is that they make no direct 
contribution to that belief’s epistemic credentials.  Al’s belief that ‘here is a mug’ 
depends for its epistemic credentials on his perceptual experience (or whatever it 
might be), not in any way at all on the laws of logic or events in the ancient past.  Had 
                                                
9 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this objection. 
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events in the ancient been different, presumably that would make no difference to the 
justification Al has for his mug belief.  Randy’s belief that is he trespassing, by 
contrast, does essentially depend for its epistemic credentials on the non-testimonial 
facts of the speaker and hearer locations, the volume of the speakers voice, and so on.  
Without these facts obtaining, his belief would not be safe.  Therefore, as these facts 
make an essential epistemic contribution, they need to be included as part of the basis 
of his belief.          
 What this points to is that in order for Randy’s belief to be safe (and 
potentially a case of knowledge), it depends on non-testimonial features.  In response 
to the third question above, of whether Randy’s belief is based wholly on Fred’s 
testimony, Pelling insists that ‘the only possible source from which Randy’s belief 
can gain its epistemic credentials is Fred’s testimony.’  It is correct that Randy’s 
belief is not just causally dependent upon Fred’s testimony, like in Audi’s case of 
someone who believes that the speaker has a soprano voice on the basis of her 
asserting that she is a soprano in a soprano voice (Audi, 1997, p. 420; Lackey, 2008, 
p. 42).  In the soprano case, the content of the assertion is irrelevant – by knowing 
what a soprano sounds like, the hearer could come to truly believe that the speaker is 
a soprano, without even understanding the content of what is said.  In Pelling’s case, 
however, the content of Fred’s assertion is relevant: Randy believes what he does 
because he understands the content of what is said. 
 But because Randy’s belief is in that sense based on Fred’s testimony, it does 
not follow that it is wholly based on it.  Recall that in the context of this discussion, a 
belief does not count as testimonial if though casually dependent on an act of 
testimony, it depends for its epistemic credentials on something non-testimonial.  
While the notion of ‘epistemic credentials’ is somewhat unclear, I take it to refer to a 
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belief’s positive epistemic status, such as its justification, or whether it amounts to 
knowledge.  If Randy’s belief is knowledge, then one of the things that the state’s 
epistemic properties depend upon is its modal robustness, and this in turn depends on 
things other than Fred’s words.  Safety is plausibly understood as an ‘epistemic 
credential’, as it is a positive epistemic status, and given that it is necessary for 
knowledge.  But whether or not Randy’s belief is safe depends not only on Fred’s 
testimony, but also upon the location from which Fred’s assertion is made, as well as 
Randy’s location, the volume at which the assertion was made, etc.  But facts like the 
locations of speakers and hearers are not themselves part of an assertion. 
So Pelling’s example shares the same defect as Goldberg’s MILK CARTON: 
given the strict notion of testimonial belief at play, answers to Questions 2 and 3 
cannot both be ‘yes’ simultaneously: either Randy’s belief is unsafe if it is based 
solely on Fred’s words, or if his belief is safe, it is not wholly based on Fred’s 
testimony, but depends for its epistemic credentials on non-testimonial factors.  
 
5. Conclusion: 
Given the above discussion, a perhaps surprising question now emerges: is 
there any knowledge that is purely testimonial?  To be sure, we need to be clear on 
what is meant by a belief being based wholly on testimony.  But if one is maximally 
strict, following Lackey and Pelling, is there any purely testimonial knowledge?  In 
other words, given the distinction drawn above between Strict and Liberal 
conceptions of testimonial belief, we can ask: assuming the Strict Conception of 
Testimonial Belief, is there any testimonial knowledge?  
In light of the discussion of TERRITORIAL FARMER, my hypothesis is that, 
assuming the Strict Conception of Testimonial Belief, it is impossible to have a case 
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of safe belief based solely on unsafe testimony.   A testimonial statement just is not 
the kind of thing that can, all by itself, ensure that all the ‘epistemic credentials’ for 
knowledge are met.  This is on the assumption that knowledge requires safety, and 
that safety is a matter of modal robustness.  Such modal properties are essential to the 
epistemic credentials of the belief, but they cannot be ensured solely by the belief 
being based on a testimonial statement.  Doing so also requires that various non-
testimonial facts obtain. 
Acknowledging that there may not be any purely testimonial knowledge, in 
the sense required by the Strict Conception of Testimonial Belief, in no way detracts 
from the importance and ineliminability of testimony as a source of knowledge.  It 
means only that we need to accept a Liberal Conception of Testimonial Belief.  Doing 
so also requires that we need to broaden our conception of what counts as an 
epistemic basis.  There is more to being an epistemic basis than being a reason or a 
piece of evidence that a subject might consciously appeal to if challenged in defense 
of their belief.  What the above discussion seems to show, is that when it comes to 
making determinations about the presence of testimonial knowledge, we need to look 
beyond the speaker’s assertions and the internally accessible evidence that a hearer 
might have regarding the reliability and truthfulness of the speaker10.   
What cases like TERRITORIAL FARMER and MILK CARTON point to is 
that factors like features of the external environment, or a third-party’s so-called silent 
monitoring, can become part of the epistemic basis of belief.  Given developments in 
extended cognition which hold that some mental processes can extend beyond the 
body to include aspects of the environment (e.g. Clark and Chalmers 1998), perhaps 
this is to be expected.  In short, I hope my discussion has highlighted that we should 
                                                
10 I am not the first to make this point.  For example, see Riggs (2009), especially pp. 211-214; see also 
Greco (2016), especially 494-496. 
 22 
not think of epistemic bases too narrowly: we need to appreciate that external factors 
and an epistemically favorable environment are essential not only to knowledge 
generally, but also to testimonial knowledge in particular.   
Suppose one accepts that we need to allow for a broader notion of testimonial 
belief, which is to say, endorse the Liberal Conception of Testimonial Belief.  But 
recall that if we allow a broader notion of a belief being based on testimony, so that it 
is a matter of a belief being based on testimony plus non-testimonial features, then the 
answer to our question becomes straightforward: obviously knowledge is possible on 
what would have been an unsafe basis, but for the fact that additional elements 
conspire to make the testimony plus non-testimonial features a safe basis.  On a 
broader conception of testimonial belief, the threat to the natural thought that safe 
testimonial belief requires safe testimony, from interesting putative counterexamples 
like Goldberg’s and Pelling’s, disappears.   
Here are two further cases by way of illustration: 
FBI PROFILER:  Hanibal has true beliefs about the location of several victims that have 
been abducted by a deranged serial killer.  He is also a pathological liar and will lie about the 
location of the victims as often as not.  If he were to assert truly where a victim was being 
held, a hearer could not on that basis know where the victim is (although she might gain a true 
belief about the victims’ whereabouts). 
 
But suppose that knowing of Hanibal’s unreliability as a source, an FBI profiler is brought in.  
She discovers through close examination, that unbeknownst to Hanibal, when, and only when, 
he tells the truth his pulse quickens.   Clearly, Hanibal is in danger of speaking falsely – while 
what he says on a given occasion may be true, there are many nearby worlds where his 
assertion is false.  He is unreliable and his assertions are not safe.  Nevertheless, Hanibal 
asserts that the first victim is in an abandoned well; his pulse quickens accordingly. The 
hearer, who in this case is the FBI profiler with knowledge of the connection between the 
pulse rate and the content of what is said, can come to know that victim is in the well.  From 
the testimony of the unreliable source, a reliable receiver of truths can acquire knowledge.  It 
is not necessary that the speaker be a reliable source of information. 
 
 
Is the FBI profiler’s belief testimonial?  It is based on Hanibal’s testimony, and that 
testimony is not only causally relevant to what is believed.  But the belief is not 
purely testimonial according to the Strict Conception of Testimonial Belief.  The 
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reason the profiler has knowledge is that her belief is based on three things: it is based 
on testimony, plus her belief that Hanibal’s pulse quickening is a reliable indicator 
that he is speaking truly, as well as her observation that his pulse quickens.  So the 
profiler’s knowledge is testimonial only on the Liberal Conception of Testimonial 
Belief.   
Consider one last similar case:  
 
CARD SHARK:  Alex is a skilled card shark and he wants to take the house.  He scopes out 
the casino and spots an inexperienced, incompetent dealer.  The dealer is utterly unreliable in 
reporting what hand he has been dealt: as often as not he will falsely report his hand.  If he 
were to assert truly what hand he had been dealt, a hearer could not on that basis know his 
hand (although she might gain a true belief about the dealer’s hand). 
 
Suppose that discovering the dealer’s weaknesses, Alex studies him carefully, and being an 
expert card shark, comes to realize that the dealer has a subtle tell: when, and only when, he 
has a high hand, he bites his lower lip.   Clearly, the dealer is in danger of speaking falsely – 
while what he says on a given occasion may be true, there are many nearby worlds where his 
assertion is false.  He is unreliable and his assertions are not safe.  Nevertheless, the dealer 
asserts that he has a full house; he proceeds to bite his lower lip. The hearer, who in this case 
is our card shark Alex with knowledge of the connection between the dealer’s biting his lower 
lip and the dealer’s assertions, can come to know that the dealer has a full house.  From the 
testimony of the unreliable source, a reliable receiver of truths can acquire knowledge.  It is 
not necessary that the speaker be a reliable source of information. 
 
 
Is the card shark’s belief testimonial?  Again, it depends on whether we adopt a strict 
or liberal conception of testimonial belief.  It is based on the dealer’s testimony, and 
that testimony is not only causally relevant to what is believed.  But the belief is not 
purely testimonial in Lackey and Pelling’s strict sense.  The reason the card shark has 
knowledge is that it based on testimony, plus the card shark’s belief that the dealer’s 
tell is a reliable indicator that his is speaking truly, as well as the observation that the 
dealer is biting his lower lip.   
 One might object that FBI and CARD SHARK are not relevantly similar to 
Goldberg and Pelling’s cases11.  After all, in both my cases, what renders them not 
'purely' testimonial is the fact that the hearer has to actively engage in inference, and 
                                                
11 Thanks to Axel Gelfert for raising this objection. 
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they draw on knowledge of circumstances external to the testimony.  It is only on that 
basis that they correctly infer which subset of testimonial claims is reliable. But in 
Goldberg and Pelling cases, the hearer can be blissfully unaware of the external 
circumstances that, in fact, contribute to the safety of his (partially) testimonial belief.  
 In response, I shall argue that these are not relevant differences.  My proposed 
cases are relevantly similar to Goldberg and Pelling’s cases: they at first blush might 
appear to be cases of testimonial knowledge based on unsafe testimony. But in all 
these cases, mine and those offered by Goldberg and Pelling, the hearers do not gain 
pure testimonial beliefs, since their beliefs depend for their epistemic credentials on 
something non-testimonial -- though it is granted these non-testimonial features vary.   
In Goldberg’s MILK CARTON case, the partially non-testimonial basis of 
Sonny’s belief is the presence of a third party who will correct the speaker if she 
speaks falsely.  In the YANKEE FAN case, like my two cases which rely on inference 
from background knowledge, Joan bases her belief not just on Ralph’s testimony 
alone, but also on her knowledge that he is asserting confidently, and also her 
knowledge that his asserting confidently is a reliable indicator that what he says is 
true.  YANKEE FAN, like my two cases, involves combining the speaker’s testimony 
with inductive evidence correlating signs with truthfulness.  In Pelling’s 
TERRITORIAL FARMER case, it is non-testimonial facts about speaker and hearer 
locations, the relative volume of the speaker’s voice etc. that are needed to fix the 
modal facts required for safety.   
In YANKEE FAN, and my two cases, the hearers are, or easily could be, 
aware of the non-testimonial factors that contribute to the safety of their belief.  
Whereas in MILK CARTON and TERRITORIAL FARMER, these factors are 
outside the hearers’ ken.  Despite these differences, what all these cases have in 
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common is that the hearers’ belief, if safe, is not purely testimonial in the strict sense: 
their beliefs essentially depend for their epistemic credentials, at least in part, on 
something non-testimonial.     
I have argued that, given the Strict Conception of Testimonial Belief required 
to generate the potentially important and novel philosophical results that Goldberg 
and Pelling aim to establish, it is impossible to have testimonial knowledge in that 
strict sense that is based on unsafe testimony.  On the other hand, we can, and should, 
allow the Liberal Conception of Testimonial Belief.  This is a broader notion of a 
belief being based on testimony, in that it is a matter of a belief being based on 
testimony plus non-testimonial features.  But since an assertion is not the kind of 
thing that can, all by itself, ensure all the epistemic credentials for knowledge are met, 















                                                
12 Thanks to Michael Brent, Constantine Sandis, and Alex Steinberg for helpful discussion.  Thanks 
also to an audience at Lingnan University, Hong Kong for beneficial comments and questions (in 
particular, I recall helpful comments from Dan Marshall, Darrell Rowbottom and Bryan Frances).  
Thanks especially to (multiple) anonymous referees, Axel Gelfert, Guy Longworth, John Greco, and 
Rhiannon James for encouragement and helpful written comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
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